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Abstract 
Cryptographic protocols have been widely used to 
protect coniniunicafions over insecure iietwork 
eii viron nien is. Existing ciptogruph ic profocols usually 
contain Jaws. To analyze these protocols and j n d  
potential flaws in them, the secure properties of them 
need be studied in depth. This paper attempts to provide 
CI iiew fiumework to analyze and prove the secure 
properties in these protocols. A nuniber of predicates 
and action jiinctions are used to nrodel the network 
coiwnrimication environment. Doniain rules are given to 
describe the transitions of principals * knowledge and 
belief states. An example of public key authentication 
prorocois has been studied and analysed. 
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Unfortunately, many cryptographic protocols are 
inherently incorrect, or at least cannot achieve the stated 
aim. Some protocols were considered perfect at first, and 
were found to contain flaws many years later [5 ,  91. To 
evaluate and verify security protocols effectively, people 
always try to analyse the secure properties of these 
protocols. 
In this paper, we propose a framework to analyse 
the secure properties of cryptographic protocols. Our 
framework is a knowledge-based logic inference system. 
This paper first gives a summary of related work on 
cryptographic protocol analysis, and then gives a detailed 
description of our knowledge based framework. 
Thereafter, we take the famous Needham-Schroeder 
public key authentication protocol [9] as an example to 
prove two important authentication properties. The last 
section concludes the paper. 
1 Introduction 
2 Related Work 
Cryptographic algorithms have been widely used to 
protect security of information going through networks, 
especially insecure networks environment, of which the 
Internet is the best example. Although there are a large 
number of “good” cryptographic algorithms that are very 
difficult to break, mere cryptography sometimes cannot 
compktely protect anything if it is not used in an 
appropriate way. To give guidelines to use cryptographic 
technology, a large number of security protocols have 
been used. These protocols do contribute greatly to 
in formati on security. 
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Since Burrows et al. proposed their famous BAN 
logic [ 3 ] ,  designing formal methods for analyzing 
cryptographic protocols has been a research highlight in 
recent years, Much research work has been conducted in 
this area and many good models and methods have been 
proposed. Generally speaking, all these methods can be 
broadly divided into two categories, namely state based 
methods and rule based methods. 
State based methods model security protocols as 
finite state machines. They search the state space 
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exhaustively to see whether all the reachable states are 
safe [IO]. If some reachable state in a security protocol is 
proved to be unsafe, a flaw may be reported; otherwise, 
the protocol will be said to be correct and safe. State 
based methods are efficient and usually can find attacks 
quickly. Many attacks have been found by this kind of 
methods. However, jt is difficult to effectively control 
the size of the state space; when the protocol is large, the 
state space will become surprisingly huge and it will be 
extremeIy time consuming, or even practically 
impossible, to search the whole space. 
Famous state based methods include Lowe’s CSP 
Method [5] and Meadows’ NRL Protocol Analyzer [7, 81. 
In Lowe’s CSP Method, The Failure Divergences 
Refinement (FDR) Checker is a model checker for CSP, 
which is used to describe concurrent systems whose 
component processes interact with each other. by 
cominunication. In Lowe’s method, FDR takes two CSP 
processes, namely a specification and an impIementation, 
as input, and tests whether the implementation refines the 
specification. It has been used to analyze many sorts of 
systems, including communication protocols and 
distributed databases. The NRL Protocol Analyzer 
developed by Meadows [7, 81 is a prototype special 
purpose verification tool, written in Prolog. As most 
other authentication protocol verification methods, the 
NRL Protocol Analyzer makes the assumption that 
principals communicate over a network controlled by a 
hostile intruder ‘who can read, modify and destroy traffic, 
and atso perform some operations, such as encryption, 
that are available to legitimate participants in the 
protocols. It has been developed for the analysis of 
cryptographic protocols that are used to authenticate 
principals and services and distribute keys in a network. 
Rule based methods, also called belief logic 
methods in some literatures, formally express what a 
principal can infer from messages received [lo]. With 
this approach, the protocols, the necessary assumptions 
and the goals of the protocols are formulated in formal 
logic. Some specific properties of the protocols can be 
proved by using the axioms and rules of the logic [4]. 
Since rule based methods do not have to search IaTge 
state space, they can normally converge very quickly in 
less than one hundred steps for a medium sized protocol, 
which is much more efficient than state exploration 
methods, and they do have found many subtle flaws. 
However, some of them only consider single runs of the 
protocols and usually, ignore the interleaving of two or 
more sessions. So .there are a lot of flaws which cannot 
be found with these logics. 1 
.- 
__  
In the recent years, a number of rule based methods 
and belief logics have been developed. Among them, the 
BAN logic introduced by Burrows et al. [3] and 
Bolignano’s model [2] are good representatives. In 
addition, a special kind of rule based models are also 
interesting. They construct proofs using specific rules. 
Paulson’s inductive inference method [lo] serves as a 
good example. 
The BAN logic was proposed in 1989 and named 
after its three creators: Michael Burrows, Martin Abadi 
and Roger Needham [3]. Their aim to create this logic 
was to provide a theoretical tool for formally analyzing 
protocols for the authentication of principals in 
distributed computing systems. It is actually the first and 
probably the most well-known rule based method for 
verifying security protocoIs, which began the research of 
protocol formal verification. Bolignano’s approach 121 is 
based on the use of general purpose formal methods. It is 
complementary with belief logic methods as it allows for 
a description of protocol, hypotheses and authentication 
properties at a finer level of precision and with more 
freedom. Paulson’s inductive method [TO] is also 
impressive. He has introduced several message analysis 
and .synthesis operators, namely purts, anaO and synth, 
’ which can be inductively defined. These operators can be 
used to.describe what information a principal can get and 
produce from what he has known. 
We also have proposed a framework [ti] to verify 
cryptographic protocols, which is knowledge-based and 
forms the basis of this paper. 
3 The knowledge based framework 
Our framework is composed of a number of basic 
notations, predicates, action functions, assumptions and 
rules, which are described as follows. 
3.1 Basic notations 
Individuals taking part in network communications 
are called prirzcipals, denoted with uppercase letters. 
Conventionally, A ,  B, . .., stand for “honest” principals, 
while I stands for the inhuder, or, in some literatures, the 
adversary or the spy, which are synonyms in our context. 
Random numbers chosen by principals serve as 
nonces to identify protocol runs uniquely and avoid 
replay attack [IO]. Nonces are normally denoted as No, 
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ii,, etc, where the subscripts imply the producers of the 
nonces. 
Every principal has some keys. In public key 
cryptosystem, the principal A basically has a pziblic key 
and a corresponding private key, which are denoted as KO 
and K;’, respectively. On the other hand, in symmetric 
key cryptosystem, two communicating principals A and 
B normally share a session key, denoted as Kab. 
A message is a piece of information sent from one 
principa1 to another. A message can consist of names of 
principals, keys, nonces, or the combination of them. 
Compound messages are bracketed using curly braces, 
such as (A, No),  A compound message consisting more 
than two components can’ be understood as nested 
compound message. For example, {MI, MZ, M3) is the 
abbreviation of ( ( M I ,  MI ) ,  M3). A message can be 
encrypted or signed with a certain key. An encrypted 
message is attached with the key as the subscript. For 
example, a message M encrypted with B’s public key can 
be written as M ,  . To gain clarity, we usually add curly 
brackets to the encrypted message, such as (hf>K, . 
3.2 Predicates 
Several predicates are used in our framework to 
describe certain belief and knowledge states. 
The predicate Know(X, M) describes X’s knowledge 
state about message M. If X knows that M is true, then 
the iogical value of the predicate is true; if X knows that 
M is false, then its logical value is false; if X has no 
information about the truth of M, then its logical vaiue is 
ignorant; if X has both information to conclude that M is 
true and false, then its logical value is inconsistent. 
Similarly, the predicate Auth(X, Y, M) describes X’s 
authentication state about Y on message M, that is, 
whether message A4 is sent by Y to Xand unmodified. 
3.3 Action functions 
A cryptographic protocol can be regarded as a series 
of message sending behaviours between different 
principals. We introduce action functions to describe this 
kind of behaviours. An action h c t i o n  Send(X, Y, h4) 
means that the principal X sends the message M to 
another principal Y. 
Accordingly, an action function Rcv(X, M) means 
that the principalXreceives the message A4 from another. 
3.4 Assumptions 
Our inference system is based on some assumptions, 
which are widely accepted by most researchers in this 
field. 
In public cryptosystems, the public key of any 
principal is known to ail other principals, while 
its private key is initially secret from others. 
Formally, 
vx. v Y. (KnoW(X, Ky)) 
In symmetric cryptosystems, the session key 
shared between two principals is initially secret 
and unknown by all other principals (except the 
key server who knows all the keys in the whole 
system). 
0 The intruder always observes all messages sent 
through the network. He tries to use all the keys 
he knows to decrypt the messages on’ the 
network and send forged messages to others. 
He COR also intercept messages sent from one 
principal to another, That is, the intruder has the 
“full” control over the network. 
There is only one intruder in the network. We 
always use I to denote the intruder. 
The intruder cannot read an encrypted message 
without the corresponding decryption key; i.e. 
secret keys are unguessable. 
An honest principal only read information 
addressed to him. 
A principal never sends messages to himself. 
Nonces are always different from each other. 
3.5 Rules 
A group of inference rules have been introduced 
into our framework to infer new knowledge fiom the old. 
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All these rules can be divided into the following 
categories: 
(1) EnrryptionlDecryption rules 
When a principal knows a message and a key, he 
can use this key to encrypt (sign) this message and get 
the encrypted (signed) message. 
When a principal knows a message encrypted 
(signed) with a key and the reverse of the key, he can use 
the reverse of the encryption (signature) key to get the 
original message. In public key cryptosystem, the public 
and private keys of a principal are reverses of each other. 
In symmetric cryptosystem, the reverse of a session key 
between two principals is itself (or a simple function of 
itself). 
(2) Message combinationlseparation rules 
When a principal knows two messages, he can 
know the combination of them. 
When a principal knows the combination of two 
messages, he can know them separately. These two rules 
can be used inductively to deal with coinpound messages 
consisting of more than two components. 
.- 
(3) Message sending/receiving rules 
3.1 Send(X, Y, M) -+ Rcv(Y, M) 
If a principal sends a message to another one, the 
object principal will eventually receive it. 
3.2 Send(X, Y, M) + Rcv(1, M) 
As one of our assumptions describes, the intruder I 
can observe all information flowing over the network. 
After a principal receives a message, he will know 
it. 
(4) Miscellaneous inference rules 
4.1 Send(X, Y, M) -+ Know(X, Iw) 
If an honest principaI X sends a message M to 
another principal Y, she must know the message A4 first. 
I f  an honest principal X received a message M, then 
there must exist another principal who sent this message 
to him (according to one of the assumptions, X cannot 
send messages to himself). 
4 Modelling Needham-Schroeder public 
key protocol 
A cryptographic protocol can be modeled as a series 
of send action functions, each meaning that a principai 
sends a message to another one. Here we take the famous 
Needham-Schroeder public key authentication protocol 
as an example, which is often used to demonsttate the 
effectiveness of a protocol verification method and 
usually regarded as a standard “testbed”. 
The original Needham-Schroeder public key 
protocol [9] involves seven steps, four of which are 
concerning public key distribution procedures. In our 
model, all principals’ public keys are open and known to 
the entire world. Therefore, the protocol can be 
simplified to only three steps [ 5 ]  as follows. 
The aim of this protocol is to establish mutual 
authentication between an initiator A and a responder B. 
As its name indicates, the protocol uses public key 
cryptography. 
At the beginning, A composes a fresh nonce No and 
sends it to 13 with her own name, encrypted with B’s 
public key. After B receives this message, he decrypts it 
and then reads the nonce N, and knows who is seeking to 
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communicate with him. B then sends back a message 
consisting of his own fresh nonce Nb as well as A's nonce 
Nu, encrypted with A's public key K, to A. To respond 
B's message, A then returns B's nonce Nb to B. 
This protocol can be easily modeled as three 
message sending actions. 
5 Proving authentication properties 
To analyze the Needham-Schroeder public key 
protocols, an important property which needs to be 
proved is authentication for the principal A, i.e. if A has 
used N, to start a run and then receives message {No, 
Nb}  (from somebody), she will believe that another 
principal B really sent the message {Nu, Nb) to her. 
Similarly, the authentication property also needs to be 
proved for B. 
At the beginning, 'we need to state some 
assumptions usefid for the proof: every principal knows 
all other's public key, but does not know any private key 
except that of himself. 
5.1 Authentication property for A 
The authentication property for A can be formalized 
as a logic formula need to prove 
(10) S W A ,  B, i" -4) 4 ) Premise 
( I  1) RcvIA, W O ,  NI K ,  ) Premise 
We start our inference fiom these two premises. 
Besides A, we only need to consider two different 
principals in the system, namely B and the intruder Z, 
according to the assumptions. Therefore there are only 
two possibilities for the formula ( I  5 ) :  2 stands for B or I.  
(1 8) Kjtow(l, 1" NI K ,  14.11 (17) 
For this formula, we still have two possibilities: 
which does not hold according to the protocol steps, or I 
intercept this information from the communication 
between A and E, implying 
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which is exactly the same as the formula (16). 
Therefore, we can safely concIude that if A has used 
Na to start a run and then receives message {Na, Nb} K ,  , 
she will believe that another principal B really sent the 
message {Nn, Nb) to her. 
5.2 Authentication property for B 
The authentication property for B states that if B 
receives (Nb)  Kc (from somebody) and used Nb, in step 2 
of the protocol, then he can believe that A has sent 
{&j Kc to somebody. This property can be similarly 
formalised as: 
with two premises: 
According to the assumptions, there are only two 
possibilities for the formula (32): D stands for A or 1. 
(33) S e n 4 4  B, IN1 4 1 I(32)  
(34) Send(z, B, { N b )  K ,  1- I(32) 
If the formula (33) holds, then the authentication 
property for B has been proved. If the formula (33) does 
not hold, the formula (34) will hold, and then we can get 
(35) Know(l, { N b )  K~ 
There are still two possibilities for it: 
(36) Nb) 
which conflict with assumptions, and 
(37) Rcv(l, I%} Kh 
Since it is impossible for B or I itself (according to the 
assumptions) to send { N b ]  Kh to I, the only possibility is 
that A sent this message to r, i.e. 
(38) send(A, 1, (Nb] K~ 
Whichever of formula (33) or (38) holds, we can 
always conclude 
having proved the authentication property for B. 
It should be noticed that the authentication 
properties for A and B are not exactly symmetric to each 
other. Actually, the original Needham-Schroeder public 
key authentication is insecure. The intruder can break the 
protocol and impersonate A in the conhunication with 
B. Therefore, it cannot be guaranteed that B can believe 
A has sent (Nb) and used 
Nb in step 2 of the protocol. 
to him if B receives (A$,) 
c c 
Actually, we can also use our framework to find the 
flaw in the protocol. In the above proof, formula (38) and 
(34) indicate the possibility that the intruder I 
impersonates A. In (38), A may send the secret 
information (Nb) Kh to I ,  who can in tum send it to B, 
impersonating A and befooling B. That is why we can 
onIy prove a “weaker” authentication property for B. 
6 Conclusions and future work 
In this paper, we have presented a new framework 
to prove secure properties for cryptographic protocols. 
The framework is a knowledge-based one. We have 
introduced notations, predicates, action hnctions and a 
number of rules to describe the knowledge and belief 
states of principals and the relationships among them. 
The rules in our framework give the conditions under 
which the knowledge and belief states can be changed, 
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and how they can change. We have presented the 
proving processes of the authentication properties for the 
simplified Needham-Schroeder public key authentication 
protocol. These examples show how to use our 
framework. 
The examples indicate the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the framework. It can prove secure 
properties of cryptographic protocols correctly and 
efficiently: proving the authentication properties for A 
only needs 15 steps, more efficient than the inductive 
method, which needs at least six lemmas, each of which 
needs three or five steps. Although it is quite efficient to 
prove secure properties of small and medium sized 
cryptographic protocols, proving large protocols will still 
be tedious and time-consuming. Therefore, we need 
implement our framework with some proof tools to make 
protocol verification an automatic procedure. 
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